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Registered Trademark Marking Requirements
Cameron K. Wehringer*
D AMY, HOURLY, it seems as though someone, someplace, is
adding after a word, name, symbol, or device .. 1 another
symbol, ®, or an asterisk (*) keyed to the words others may
add immediately next to, or under, the word, name [etc.]. These
words, having an almost mystic quality to them, are "Registered
in U. S. Patent Office" or "Reg. U. S. Pat. Off." Most add the ®
or the word equivalent on the goods, on the label, in advertising,
on television showings, and practically any other place. It is all
done for "protection." But protection against what?
Many people who see the ®, or equivalent, probably agree
with the advertising people (who might believe that trademark
lawyers exist solely to despoil their copy and art work) that ®
means something, but what? With a shrug of their collective
shoulders they don't know, probably care less, and if asked as
to the looks, might say it is not an attractive addition! The
worst of it is, from the viewpoint of the interested attorney and
layman, that there is no consistency as to where and how fre-
quently @ appears. The ® symbol is at times rarely used,
sometimes moderately used, and sometimes perhaps over-used.
Two major questions then. What is the necessary use, and what
is the situation as to prevailing use?
Necessary Use
The use of @ and the word equivalents, is found in the
Trademark Act of 1946.2 First in Section 29 appears a statement
to disregard a prior number section. This earlier section, 22,
concerns constructive notice of a claim of trademark ownership
of Principal Registrations.8 The @ section, 29, reads in full: 4
*Member of the New York Bar.
1 Trademark definition in greater part as given in the Trademark Act of
1946 (Lanham Act) Section 45 (15 U. S. C. 1127).
2 Trademark Act of 1946, Section 29 (15 U. S. C. 1111).
3 The section, 22, is short and to the point:
Registration of a mark on the principal register provided by this Act
or under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905,
shall be constructive notice of the registrant's claim of ownership
thereof. 15 U. S. C. 1072.
4 15 U. S. C. 1111.
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1961
REGISTERED TRADEMARK
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 22 hereof, a regis-
trant of a mark registered under the Act of March 3, 1881,
or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register
established by this Act, shall give notice that his mark is
registered by displaying with the mark as used the words
"Registered in U. S. Patent Office" or "Reg. U. S. Pat. Off."
or the letter R enclosed within a circle, thus ®; and in any
suit for infringement under this Act by a registrant failing
so to mark goods bearing the registered mark, or by a regis-
trant under the Act of March 19, 1920, or by the registrant
of a mark on the supplemental register provided by this Act
no profits and no damages shall be recovered under the pro-
visions of this Act unless the defendant had actual notice of
the registration.
These words serve to treat alike with 1946 Act registrations
trademarks registered under the earlier Acts. The Section can
be summarized as warning that if ® (or stated equivalents) is not
placed on the goods, then profits and damages are not recover-
able, unless the alleged infringer had actual notice.
There are then, four points re @. (1) The @ symbol (or
equivalent) is to be used to mark the goods, which may be on
the goods. Usage elsewhere, such as in advertising, in leaflets,
and so on, is not required by statute as to (2) Recovery of
profits and damages under the Act. If the advertising art, for
example, is found to be of greater importance than a speculative
accounting by a probable infringer, (3) Failure to use ® will
not preclude an injunction against the offending use.5 The
notice provisions of this Section do not affect opposition proceed-
ings, nor a common-law unfair competition action. (4) To re-
cover financially from an infringer without ®, actual notice is
needed.
1. Use of ® on the Goods
Use of the word "obvious" in law is dangerous, but it seems
"obvious" that sometimes a trademark cannot be used to mark
the goods, that is on the goods. The goods might be a liquid,
too tiny, or another reason may prevent marking. Then it should
follow that use on the container, on a label affixed to the con-
tainer, or use in similar proximity would be use on the goods,
that is, marking the goods.( This was so found in the Dexedrine
5 Note 20, infra. Section 34 (15 U. S. C. 1116).
6 Merrick v. Sharp & Dohme, 185 F. 2d 713, 718 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. den.
340 U. S. 954, 95 L. Ed. 687, 71 Sup. Ct. 573 (1951).
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case7 where
On the label of each bottle there appears the word Dexe-
drine footnoted with an asterisk after which appears "T. M.
Reg. U. S. Pat. Off." and a reproduction of the tablet, indi-
cating its color, shape, and size with the designation "Trade
[picture] Mark." We conclude that the requirements of
Title 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 1051, 1072, and 1111, have been com-
plied with and accordingly the District Court did not err in
its preliminary conclusion that Dexedrine is a valid trade-
mark.
Not only does this support the statement that label usage is use
on the goods, but it also supports use of an asterisk (*) keyed
to an identification and the correct marking for configuration
trademark.8 The present Section 29 is analogous to the 1905 Act
Section 28. The 1905 Section spelled out the proximity factor
with clarity. 9 It was quoted in a 1914 case where an accounting
was refused as being an empty act. The reason was that dam-
ages could not be recovered as notice was not given by use nor
to the person accused.' 0 Without affixation of ® to the goods,
proof of notice is required. This can be a problem as was shown
in another 1905 Act case where the notice was held insufficient
upon appeal." Therefore, marking the goods is advisable if
profits and damages are likely to be sought should another in-
fringe. Use of ® on the goods becomes a policy and business de-
cision. It may be thought, on the other hand, that financial
recovery is too speculative, or that an injunction would be suf-
7 Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith Kline & French Lab., 207 F. 2d 190, 99
USPQ 1 (9th Cir. 1953).
8 The related question as to a container being admissible as a trademark
is discussed in Wehringer, Two for One: Trademarks and Design Patents,
to be published.
9 Section 28. That it shall be the duty of the registrant to give notice to the
public that a trade-mark is registered, either by affixing thereon the words
"Registered in U. S. Patent Office," or abbreviated thus, "Reg. U. S. Pat.
Off.," or when, from the character or size of the trade-mark, or from its
manner of attachment to the article to which it is appropriated, this
cannot be done, then by affixing a label containing a like notice to the
package or receptacle wherein the article or articles are inclosed; and in
any suit for infringement by a party failing so to give notice of registration
no damages shall be recovered, except on proof that the defendant was
duly notified of infringement, and continued the same after such notice.
33 Stats. 730. 15 U. S. C. 107. Pinaud, Inc. v. Huebschman, 27 F. 2d 531,
538 (E. D. N. Y. 1928) aft. w. o. op. 27 F. 2d 538 (2d Cir. 1928), cert. den.
278 U. S. 644, 73 L. Ed. 558, 49 Sup. Ct. 80 (1928).
10 Rossman v. Gamier, 211 Fed. 401, 406, 407 (8th Cir. 1914).
11 Perry v. Amer. Hecolite Denture Corp., 78 F. 2d 556, 559 (8th Cir. 1935).
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ficient should another infringe. The individual situation will be
controlling.
2. Recovery of Profits and Damages
Section 29 is explicit as to the recovery of profits and dam-
ages. 2 The 1905 Act analogous Section 28 was equally blunt.
13
There seems little reason to argue that profits and damages are
not available if @ is not used; or if not marked, that financial
recovery is only for the sales made after proper notice was
given. 14 Rudolf Callmann wrote as to the 1946 Act, that if the
aggrieved party "sues on his common-law trade-mark, recovery
of full damages and profits should be permitted." 15 The United
States Supreme Court has so found in a matter concerning a
1905 Act Registration. After summarizing Section 28, the Court
pointed up the distinction: 16
The infringement that is sued for is infringement of a
registered trade-mark, not infringement of a trade-mark.
That is the plain meaning of [Section 28 of the 1905 Act]
17
Were it thought that jurisdiction, financial recovery, or any other
statutory provision might be a problem, actual notice of the
registered trademark concerned would cure such problematical
defect'4-both under Section 28 of the 1905 Act and under Sec-
tion 29 of the 1946 Act. If profits and damages are all important,
perhaps consideration should be given to the common-law as-
pects of the individual matter, to see if a solution is present.
The question as to the distinction between profits and dam-
ages, what properly constitutes each, and what are the deductible
items found in arriving at an evaluation in an accounting need
not here concern us. There is an excellent paper reviewing this
for the interested reader by Robert Price.19
12 Supra note 4.
13 Supra note 9.
14 Treasure Imports, Inc. v. Henry Amdur & Sons, Inc., 127 F. 2d 3 (2d
Cir. 1942).
15 4 Callmann, Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks 1872 (2d Ed. 1950).
16 Stark Bros. Co. v. Stark, 255 U. S. 50, 51, 52, 65 L. Ed. 496, 41 Sup. Ct.
221 (1921).
17 Supra note 9.
18 Supra note 16.
19 Price, Financial Recovery in an Action for Trademark Infringement,
47 TMR 1297 (1957).
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3. An Injunction Does Not Depend Upon ®
The statute is clear in its statement that an injunction lies
irrespective of the use of ®.20 This provision is also consistent
with the 1905 Act remedies. A distinction was made between
enjoining infringement and restraining for unfair trade from
granting an accounting in a case where the registered trademark
notice was missing.21 As clearly stated in an Admiral case,
22
where the court found that damages could not be sustained:
The right to damages as provided by the statute is a distinct
and separate remedy from the injunctive relief demanded.23
In the Q-Tips case,24 after determining that Q-Tips, a valid trade-
mark, was infringed by Johnson's Cotton Tips, the court noted:
, . . the remaining issue is whether the district court was
correct in giving the plaintiff an injunction but declining to
order an accounting of profits and damages.
25
Its answer was:
* . . that if there is no showing that the plaintiff's business
has been hurt or that the defendant has made profit out of
the infringement, there is no call for relief other than that
given by injunction. 2
While this goes to the "when" of an accounting, it also shows
that an injunction and other relief are not dependent, one upon
the other. Each is separate. 27 An injunction can lie-without ®.
4. Actual Notice
The question of notice arises when @ is not used on the
goods, and not only an injunction is contemplated, but also the
20 Sections 32(1) and 34 (15 U. S. C. 1114(1) and 1116). Noted 3 Callmann,
op. cit. supra note 15, 1720.
21 Rossman v. Carnier, supra note 10. Cf. Ramirez & Feraud Chili Co. v.
Las Palmas, 146 F. Supp. 594, 599, 110 USPQ 525, 47 TMR 217, 221, 222 (SD
Cal. 1956), afid. memo dec. 245 F. 2d 874, 114 USPQ 73, cert. den. 355
U. S. 927, 2 L. Ed. 2d 357, 78 Sup. Ct. 384 (1958).
22 Admiral Corp. v. Admiral Employment Bureau, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 629,
__ USPQ -- , 47 TMR 776 (D. C. N. D. Ill. 1957).
23 Id. 151 F. Supp. at 631, 47 TMR at 777, 778.
24 Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 206 F. 2d 144, __ USPQ ,
TMR __ (3rd Cir. 1953), cert. den. 346 U. S. 867, 98 L. Ed. 377, 74 Sup. Ct.
106 (1953).
25 Id. at 145.
26 Id. at 149.
27 Ibid. The court in noting that the evidence supporting an accounting
was not brought forth in the beginning graphically remarked:
... he is too late if he kept it for a second bite of the cherry.
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recovery of profits and damages, which will date from the time
of actual notice. 28 The question is, what constitutes sufficient
notice? What is actual notice is not clear.29 Should actual notice
be only express notice? 30 Or, may actual notice also be implied
notice? 3 ' The answer in a trademark matter is unknown.
Implied notice, were it included in actual notice, means that
the man who exercises reasonable diligence would get that
knowledge or notice so as to learn the mark is registered.32 Thd
cases discussing implied notice are real property cases, and, it
can be argued, should be persuasive in trademark matters. As-
suming both express and implied notices were to be held part of
actual notice, the question would concern the type of facts
which would inform a reasonably diligent person.
28 Admiral Corp. v. Sewing Machine Sales Corp., 156 F. Supp. 796, 798,
116 USPQ 17, 48 TMR 484 (SD NY 1957). 3 Callmann, op cit. supra note 15,
1720 states:
Section 29 provides that damages shall not be assessed unless the
defendant had "actual notice of the registration"; there is no such
requirement with respect to the issuance of the injunction.
29 In a footnote to United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, Etc., 85 F.
Supp. 986, 1002 (footnote 13) (S. D. Cal. 1949) the court noted:
A search of the authorities for a definition of "notice" in this type of
a case [suit to condemn land] reveals that this word, with its adjectives
"actual," "constructive," "implied," and "presumptive," has not, in all
of its ramifications, acquired a standardized meaning in the legal
nomenclature . . . If a reasonably prudent man is put upon inquiry
he can be charged with actual notice.
Citing: Hawke v. California Realty & Construction Co., 28 Cal. 377, 152
Pac. 959 (1915).
30 Express notice is that kind of actual notice which consists of knowledge
actually brought personally home; information which of itself gives actual
notification. Express notice embraces not only personal knowledge, but
also that which is communicated by direct information, either written or
oral, from those who are cognizant of the fact communicated. 66 C. J. S.
Notice Sec. 4.
31 Notice is actual when it is directly and personally given to the person
to be notified . . . may be either express or implied. 66 C. J. S. Notice Sec.
3 . . . implied notice is generally regarded as a kind of actual notice which
consists of knowledge of facts so informing that a reasonably cautious
person would be led by them to the ultimate fact; that which, if prosecuted
with ordinary diligence, will furnish information of the fact . . . implied
notice is generally regarded as differing from constructive notice, in respect
of the character of the inference on which it rests, in that implied notice
arises from an inference of fact . . . while constructive notice is the
creature of positive law, or rests on strictly legal presumptions which are
not allowed to be controverted . . . Id. Sec. 5.
32 United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, Etc., supra note 29; Continent-
al Supply Co. v. Marshall, 52 F. Supp. 717 (WD Okla. 1953), rev. on other
grounds, 152 F. 2d 300 (10th Cir. 1946), cert. den. 327 U. S. 803, 90 L. Ed.
1028, 66 Sup. Ct. 962 (1946); United States v. West, 132 F. Supp. 934, 936
(ND Ga., 1955), Mayor Etc. of Baltimore v. Whittington, 78 Md. 231, 236,
237, 27 AtI. 984 (1893); Bridgewater Boro v. Pa. P. U. C., 181 Pa. Sup. 84,
97, 124 A. 2d 165 (1956).
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Consider for a moment what would be implied (actual)
notice if the ® were to be required in advertising henceforth,
but not used. Assume an infringement occurs. Would it not be
implied that a reasonably diligent person, who is alleged to have
infringed, would see the product which has been advertised?
Can there be exceptions such as mail order items, sectionally
distributed but nationally advertised items, and other similar
cases? Probably for certain items a reasonably diligent person
would be expected to see the goods-and ®. Most likely this
would be true for certain nationally advertised and distributed
products. Examples might include: soap, cigarettes, toothpaste,
lipstick and other daily-living items. A rationale of common-
sense seems to be indicated.
If marking were omitted on the goods, but included in ad-
vertising, could implied notice be found? Would this not be a
question of fact? One of the items might be the extent of the
advertising concerned, and the type. Again, take a daily-living
item, such as aspirin, hair tonic, or toothpaste. Could it be
argued that the advertising failed to reach a person exercising
reasonable diligence? Here, the only diligence would be to keep
open one's eyes and ears. And yet, there seem to be counter-
arguments for even the most heavily promoted items-as the
responsibility for reaching the alleged infringer would then be
on the advertiser-complainant, and not on the person who is
to exercise diligence. Should this mythical person have chosen
magazine "X" or magazine "Y"? Should he have watched a
particular television program? Or should his search have been
confined to the newspapers? The questions would be asked and
the answers uncertain. The importance of @ on the goods
looms.
If marking were omitted, both on the goods and in other
media (assuming other media were used), what would be im-
plied (actual) notice? Can it be asserted that a man exercising
reasonable diligence would learn of the registered nature of the
mark? Would this infer he would use a qualified search organi-
zation? Which one? Even the best ones do not always report
the same marks. Does not this line of inquiry also need an
answer to the question-would this reasonably diligent man
learn of the mark, and then consider whether it is registered?
There are many questions, but few answers at this time.
The easiest course is to assume that for trademark matters,
actual notice might mean express notice, or that knowledge
May, 1961
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actually brought home to the party to be affected thereby.3 3 If
the marking program for trademarks is considered in this light,
some problems may be avoided and evaded.
The safest course is to use ®, on the goods. This ® use
should be clear. But what is clear use is disputed among users
as seen in the following section.
Current Practice
1. Why in Advertising?
A logical question appears as why bother to use @ in adver-
tising and other media not akin to on the goods. There seem to
be two reasons. The first: A use of ® might "frighten" and
thereby deter would-be-infringers. The second: The @ use may
help the public realize the identified word is a trademark and
not a generic word.
The first reason concerning the warning or frightening of
would-be-infringers is one not found in the cases. To the extent
it is a valid and sufficient reason depends upon an individual's
judgment.
The second reason can in turn be divided into two situations.
Situation "A" is where the mark is suggestive of, or close to the
generic word. This might be contended to include a mark such
as Cream Wipt for salad dressings containing cream,3 4 or Paint
Masters for dry paste, and ready-mixed paints,3 5 or Easy for
touch-up enamel supplied in self-spraying containers for applica-
tion to domestic laundry and other appliances and Easytint for
white paint particularly constructed to be mixed with various
colors as desired.36 In such cases, it can be asserted that vigilance
is needed to make the public realize the trademark nature of the
word or words. This may be helpful especially if others have
33 Strahorn-Hutton Evans Commission Co. v. Florer, 7 Okla. 499, 54 Pac.
710 (1898).
34 This was not the issue. The question was whether Dream Whip for a
pudding mix, inter alia, was likely to be confused with Cream Wipt for
salad dressings containing cream. The Court thought confusion was likely.
Cream Wipt Foods, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., 126 USPQ 55 (CCPA
1960).
35 Inter alia. The mark was found not descriptive. Benjamin Moore & Co.
v. Lasting Products Co., 126 USPQ 207 (Tm. Bd. 1960).
36 The court affirmed the dismissal of an opposition against Easytint based
on the mark Easy for the respective goods noted in the text. Murray Corp.
of America v. Red Spot Paint Co., 126 USPQ 390 (CCPA 1960). A list
of other Easy-marks was given in the opinion.
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similar marks for similar goods-with the line defining confusing
similarity being hair-line thin.
Situation "B" is where the trademark owner is almost too
successful and must vigorously assert his rights to show his
trademark is just that, and has not become generic. If the
trademark owner is successful in his sales promotion he may find
his word becoming a companion to Cellophane as
It . . . makes no difference what efforts or money the Du
pont Company expended in order to persuade the public
that 'cellophane' means an article of Du Pont manufacture.
So far as it did not succeed in actually converting the world
to its gospel it can have no reliefA7
In such cases, the mark must be policed, its distinctiveness pre-
served, and extraordinary care taken to prevent misuse. This
includes care in the trademark owner's own use of the mark in
all media.38 The use must be a proper use.3 9
However, does not this beg the question to some extent?
Why, other than on the goods, cannot the trademark owner
merely state something akin to
[Mark]--Trademark
and not ® or equivalent? There seems to be no reason according
to the statute, viz. profits, damages, and injunctive relief, why
he cannot. And it would have a blessing when the item is ex-
ported to Canada. "Trademark" use would carry over a well
understood term common to both countries. There is then no
necessity of separate advertising runs to distinguish the U. S.
registration notice from the separate Canadian situation.40
37 Du Pont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 85 F. 2d 75, 81 (2d
Cir. 1936), cert den. 299 U. S. 601, 81 L. Ed. 443, 57 Sup. Ct. 194 (1936).
Also "aspirin." Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 Fed. 505 (DC S. D. N. Y.
1921).
38 3 Callmann, op. cit. supra note 15, 1154.
39 Clairol, Incorporated v. Roux Distributing Co., Inc., 126 USPQ 397
(CCPA 1960). This was a cancellation action. The Court noted (at p. 398):
Even though 'color bath' may have been a novel way of describing
a liquid for coloring hair, the words were, as [first] used by appellee
[Roux], nevertheless descriptive of its hair coloring liquid at the time
when appellant [Clairol], to more fully describe the goods, added the
common word "hair" thereto. The resultant expression is nothing but
the normal use of the English language.
Hair Color Bath had been a supplemental registration for hair tinting and
coloring preparations and was stricken from the register as generic.
40 If it so happens that the same marks are registered in both the United
States and Canada, then possibly the mark followed by (or by an asterik
(Continued on next page)
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Other than on the goods, assume the mark is only identified
by "Trademark." The main disadvantage might be the first men-
tioned-that of not sufficiently "frightening" the would-be-
infringer. After all, the use of ® symbol does carry with it a
certain aura of holiness. This holiness to the viewer may only
be that the mark is somewhat unique, that it was registrable,
and that there is an ownership claim,41 but is this not a lot?
The use of ® does not affect the trademark owner's rights. Nor
does it affect his remedies. And certainly it does not affect his
right to an injunction. The advertising director would find this
lack of differentiation a boon. The reader might also. Both for
the reason that the picture is not confused with (e.g.) asterisks
keyed to "trademark" for the non-registered trademarks and ®
or a dagger (t) keyed to "Reg. U. S. Pat. Off." for registered
marks, or similar segregation of value. 42
Du Pont is one of the finest exponents of proper trademark
usage, including use of ( or the word equivalent.4  Yet, in its
most excellent booklet on "How to Use the Trademarks . . ."
the stress is not placed on the registered aspect. The stress,
properly, falls on the "Du Pont trademark" claim. For example,
Du Pont shows an illustrative footnote for its Dacron as "Du
Pont trademark for its polyester fiber." In its section on "Writ-
ten Advertising" appears the statement as to Dacron:
If preferred, the circled "R" can be replaced by an asterisk
referring to a footnote "*Du Pont trademark" or both may
be done.
(Continued from preceding page)
keyed to) "Registered Trademark in the U. S. and in Canada" (which has
been seen) could be used. This does not follow the Section 29 language
viz. "Pat. Off." which in non-on the goods use, is unnecessary. Whether
a U. S. Court would hold this met the requirements of the marking
section if used on the label-the issue being raised in a demand for an
accounting-is unknown. It does take a chance in that it departs from
the statutory language.
41 Section 7(b) reads:
A certificate of registration of a mark upon the principal register
provided by this Act shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of
the registration, registrant's ownership of the mark, and of registrant's
exclusive right to use the mark in commerce in connection with the
goods or services specified in the certificate, subject to any conditions
and limitations stated therein.
(15 U. S. C. 1057b).
42 Much less the confusion if Canada is also to be considered.
43 After Cellophane, supra note 37, this is to be expected!
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The examples which follow in the booklet, if not reviewed with
this statement in mind, might lead the quick-reader to believe
® is required. It is, only if the above statement is not used.
What holds true for advertising, would hold true for other
non-on the goods usage. This would include booklets, leaflets,
lists of products, sales slips, and so on ad infinitum.
2. How Used on the Goods?
Varying practices are followed. One of the more familiar
rules of thumb advises use of ® with the "first and most promi-
nent use" of the trademark. Whether this is more or less effec-
tive than an accurate, but quiet and positive legend that
[Mark] is Reg. U. S. Pat. Off. for [goods]
has not been resolved.
Some practices seem to be an effort to follow the statute,
but at the same time to avoid any intrusion into the advertising
art work. Might these be found to be without the spirit of the
statute and worthless? There are as many examples as time is
taken to find them. Some of the more prominent include use of
such small type in comparison to the type elsewhere used, and
especially in comparison to the type for the trademark, that the
® symbol is seen only when one assiduously searches for it.
Examples which follow go with the phrase: "Only the names
and places are changed to protect the innocent."
A well-known and heavy-selling cereal has a hard-to-read
@ after the relatively inconspicuous use of the house mark on
the back panel, and a @ after one of the smaller uses of the
cereal trademark on the side panel. There is also a side panel
statement:
Trade Marks Reg. U. S. Pat Off.
The question is-what are the trademarks concerned? The two
found after a search? Others? On the panel where this state-
ment appears, neither house mark nor trademark is used. It
would seem better to state
[House mark] and [cereal trademark]-Reg. U. S. Pat.
Off.
4 4
44 This has the added virtue of being adaptable to a trademark licensing
situation. Language similar to "by [company], the trademark owner"
could follow. There are other requirements in trademark licensing. One
article is Wehringer, Trademark Licenses: Control Provided, Control
Exercised, 47 TMR 287 (1957).
May, 1961
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A prominent whisky distiller has a legend "Trademarks and
Label Style Reg. U. S. Pat. Off." but nothing tells what are the
trademarks.
On the other hand, in the category of non-@ use, is found a
woman's hair spray from a prominent beauty house. There is no
indication as to what is its trademark, and if it is registered.
Several popular cigarettes have absolutely no trademark claim
nor notice as to registration of the mark or marks on the package.
A prominent instant coffee manufacturer does not claim its mark
nor symbol on the label, although once its house mark was the
subject of a suit finally decided by the United States Supreme
Court. Several domestic liquor distillers do not identify their
trademarks. One imported one states "Registered Trademark"
but whether this means the country of origin, or the United
States, or both, is not known. A prominent toiletry manufacturer
who has seen its sales and advertising budget skyrocket does not
use ® for its trademarks or its house marks on its products.
An example of a moderate use of @ is sometimes found.
Pick up a bottle of a certain premium beer, well advertised as
a quality product, and one can almost play a game of "guess
how many @ symbols there are." The @ is of a size that is
quickly visible, yet the thickness of line and intensity of color
blends with the art work when the bottle is on a shelf. It seems
to illustrate a good blending of advertising and legal require-
ments. The several @ symbols each identify a particular trade-
mark. One is for the "brand," another for the slogan-mark, a
third for the design-mark, a fourth for the label-mark, and so on.
This seems to be within the letter and the spirit of Section 29.
Rarely, it seems, is there an over-emphasis of ®. This would
be used so that whenever and wherever the trademark appears
an identification such as @ or word equivalent would follow.
The emphasis probably would be on the word equivalent. There
might also be a statement in the textual portion of the label
or advertising media of the claim to trademark ownership. It
might be expected that this would be in a field where the trade-
mark owner is predominant. One prominent synthetic fiber
manufacturer is found to use the ® word equivalent quite
heavily.
What is advisable depends upon the nature of the mark and
the importance of money.45 Certainly if a mark is "weak," or
45 This money factor can be dual: Both welcome in the event of an in-
fringement suit and as a deterrent factor to avoid infringement suits.
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suggestive, or likely to become generic, more precautions are
likely to be taken. This is not merely to provide for a claim for
profits and damages, but to emphasize the trademark claim. If
the mark is "strong," and if in the event of an infringement
arising an injunction alone, or money from the date of actual
notice, would be considered satisfactory, then any use of @
seems unneeded. Business risks must be assessed in view of
the individual legal situation.
Solutions-?
An interesting solution is that posed by Lewis Garner 4 6 in
advocating trademark use as the criteria of what is a trademark.
He commented that:
To display the terms "Trademark," "Brand," "Reg. U. S.
Pat. Off.," "®," etc., next to or under trademarks is one
feature of trademark display, but it is only important to the
extent-and no more-that it causes the public to react to
the mark as a trademark. If a trademark is used properly,
the public will subconsciously and automatically insert the
word "brand" between the trademark and the product name,
regardless of whether the user himself displays this term.47
Although his article goes beyond the scope of the matter in
hand, considering any word susceptible of trademark ownership
when used as a trademark, it would eliminate the problem as to
use of ®.
Another solution might be the statutory setting of stand-
ards for the marking of @. This would go beyond the present
requirements which are causing some difficulty, and state when
and where. For example, the Copyright Law requires a stated
legend 48 and in a stated place. 49 Can this type of requirement be
adapted for registered trademark usage? It might be required
to be in a certain place, such as with the manufacturer's name,
with such other notices that might be required, and so on. The
legend itself might be:
[Trademark]-Reg. U. S. Pat. Off.
with a substitution of ® permitted. This would permit a listing
of trademarks to avoid the "cereal situation" and could include
46 Garner, A Display Theory of Trademarks, 47 TMR 303 (1957).
47 Id., 47 TMR at 325.
48 17 U. S. C. 19.
49 17 U. S. C. 20.
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labels, designs, and so forth by either a miniaturization or by a
word identification. This might be similar to:
[Trademark], label, and container-@
This legend could be followed by the registrant's name if the
marks are used by a licensee. For a non-registered trademark
the use of the mark followed by the word "Trademark" would
seem to be a natural development, adopted by custom and con-
venience in avoiding questions as to what is a trademark. This
marking revision need not be an onerous provision, and could
be keyed to the item of profits and damages. In other words, as
today, an injunction would lie without the legend,50 but profits
and damages could not be obtained unless actual notice has been
given. (Should actual notice be confined to express notice?)
One advantage to this would be apparent to the advertising
staff. Copy could serve its purpose, even when that copy is a
label or other usage on the goods. Litigation might be minimized
as to what is or is not proper usage, and the reasonable diligent
person need not hunt around the goods or container to deter-
mine whether the mark is registered-or contra-wise, if it has
been dedicated to the public as a generic term.
If a change is made, why should not
Registered in U. S. -or- Reg. U. S.51
50 Thus this would not be in conflict with the Paris Convention, which the
U. S. ratified on May 30, 1887, and the London Revision, ratified on June
2, 1934. 4 Callmann, op. cit. Supra note 15, 2199. As he stated (at p. 2217):
Article 5 expressly provides: "Articles shall not be required to bear
any sign or mention of the patent, the utility model, or the registration
of the trade-mark or of the deposit of the industrial design or model
for recognition of the right."
Article 5 is not inconsistent with section 29 of the Lanham Act. The
"right" referred to in Article 5 is not to be understood as the right
to recover for infringement, but as the right to claim ownership and
use of the mark as applied to goods or services and the right to be
protected under the Convention.
51 The symbol ® can still be used. This symbol is occasionally used
abroad by local companies, but such use is without comparable statutory
authority as provided in the United States (15 U. S. C. 1111). There is no
recognized and accepted meaning for ® in such foreign countries. How-
ever, an international agreement could provide a code for use. This might
be: When only ® appears this would signify that the trademark is
registered in the country of manufacture. When border-crossing is in-
volved @ would be followed by the International Code Letters of the
country or countries where registered. Thus, ® USA would identify a
trademark registered in the United States, @ D a mark registered in Ger-
many, @ F a mark registered in France, and so on. The traveler will
recognize these letters as they are used on automobile licenses. Use is,
(Continued on next page)
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be sufficient. The place, the Patent Office, is not important to the
viewer. What is important is that a trademark has been prop-
erly registered under a federal statute, and if the statute places
the registration burdens in the Patent Office, or another [new]
division, this seems to be procedural.
In the alternative, things can proceed as they have. No
problems seem to have arisen. But, let ® be confined to where
it is required-on the goods. After all, the fifth point given as
an accomplishment of the 1946 Act was52
Generally to simplify trade-mark practice . . .
(Continued from preceding page)
therefore, established. When a mark is registered in more than one country,
the advantage of this proposal is most readily seen. Illustrating the above:
As now, a product manufactured in the United States, and here sold,
carries ®. This is sufficient. The product is exported to another country
and there the mark is also registered. The registrant wishes to have this
known. The symbol is then ® USA, F. Of course, the desirability of noting
registration is here not questioned. If it is not important to the trademark
owner and registrant, the marking discussion is academic.
52 Senate Committee on Patents, Senate Report No. 1333, May 14, 1946.
79th Cong. 2nd Sess. 1946. U. S. Code Cong. Serv. 1274, 1276.
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